Incentives for Pollution Control: Regulation or (and?) Information by Foulon, Jérôme et al.
Série Scientifique
Scientific Series
99s-11
Incentives for Pollution
Control: Regulation or
(and?) Information
Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie,
Benoît Laplante
Montréal
Mars 1999
CIRANO
Le CIRANO est un organisme sans but lucratif constitué en vertu de la Loi des compagnies du Québec.
Le financement de son infrastructure et de ses activités de recherche provient des cotisations de ses
organisations-membres, d=une subvention d=infrastructure du ministère de l=Industrie, du Commerce, de
la Science et de la Technologie, de même que des subventions et mandats obtenus par ses équipes de
recherche. La Série Scientifique est la réalisation d=une des missions que s=est données le CIRANO, soit
de développer l=analyse scientifique des organisations et des comportements stratégiques.
CIRANO is a private non-profit organization incorporated under the Québec Companies Act. Its
infrastructure and research activities are funded through fees paid by member organizations, an
infrastructure grant from the Ministère de l=Industrie, du Commerce, de la Science et de la Technologie,
and grants and research mandates obtained by its research teams. The Scientific Series fulfils one of the
missions of CIRANO: to develop the scientific analysis of organizations and strategic behaviour.
Les organisations-partenaires / The Partner Organizations
$École des Hautes Études Commerciales
$École Polytechnique
$Université Concordia
$Université de Montréal
$Université du Québec à Montréal
$Université Laval
$Université McGill
$MEQ
$MICST
$Alcan Aluminium Ltée
$Banque Nationale du Canada
$Bell Canada
$Développement des ressources humaines Canada (DRHC)
$Egis
$Fédération des caisses populaires Desjardins de Montréal et de l=Ouest-du-Québec
$Hydro-Québec
$Imasco
$Industrie Canada
$Microcell Labs inc.
$Raymond Chabot Grant Thornton
$Téléglobe Canada
$Ville de Montréal
© 1999 Jérôme Foulon, Paul Lanoie et Benoît Laplante. Tous droits réservés. All rights reserved.
Reproduction partielle permise avec citation du document source, incluant la notice ©.
Short sections may be quoted without explicit permission, provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.
ISSN 1198-8177
Ce document est publié dans l=intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la
recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les
opinions émises sont sous l=unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement
les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires.
This paper presents preliminary research carried out at CIRANO and aims to encourage discussion
and comment. The observations and viewpoints expressed are the sole responsibility of the authors.
They do not necessarily represent positions of CIRANO or its partners.
Incentives for Pollution Control:
Regulation or (and?) Information*
Jérôme FoulonH, Paul LanoieI, Benoît Laplante’
Résumé / Abstract
                                                
*
 Corresponding Author: Paul Lanoie, CIRANO, 2020 University Street, 25th floor, Montréal, Qc, Canada
H3A 2A5        Tel: (514) 985-4020        Fax: (514) 985-4039        e-mail: lanoiep@cirano.umontreal.ca
Les auteurs remercient le Réseau canadien sur la gestion durable des forêts pour avoir financé cette
recherche.
†
  École des Hautes Études Commerciales
‡
  École des Hautes Études Commerciales and CIRANO
§
  Banque Mondiale
De plus en plus de décideurs publics dans le domaine de
l’environnement ont adopté des politiques de diffusion de l’information pour créer
des incitations à une meilleure performance environnementale. Dans cette étude,
nous examinons l’impact d’une liste noire de pollueurs publiée à tous les six mois,
depuis 1990, par le Ministère de l’environnement en Colombie-Britannique qui,
parallèlement à cela, poursuit une stratégie traditionnelle de contrôle et de mise en
application de la réglementation. Les recherches précédentes ont examiné de façon
isolée l’impact des mesures traditionnelles de réglementation et l’impact des
programmes d’information, alors que nous proposons d’étudier simultanément les
effets de ces deux types de mesures. Ce faisant, nous pourrons avoir une idée de
l’impact « relatif » des mesures traditionnelles et émergentes. Nos résultats
suggèrent que la liste des pollueurs de Colombie-Britannique a eu un impact plus
important que les poursuites et les amendes traditionnellement émises par les
autorités gouvernementales. Nos résultats montrent également que l’adoption de
normes environnementales plus strictes a eu un effet important sur la performance
environnementale des usines étudiées.
An increasing number of regulators have adopted public disclosure
programs to create incentives for pollution control. In this paper, we study the
impact of British Columbia’s list of polluters whereby the province’s
environmental regulator reveals the name of plants which are either not complying
with the regulation or are of concern to the regulator. Simultaneously however, the
regulator continues to undertake legal action for those violating the regulation.
Previous analyses have focused on studying either the impact of the traditional
monitoring and enforcement practices or the impact of information programs. In
this paper, we perform an empirical analysis of the impact of both traditional
enforcement and information strategies within the context of a single program. We
thus provide insights on the relative impact of the traditional (fines and penalties)
and emerging (information) enforcement strategies. Our results suggest that
British Columbia’s list of polluters has a larger impact on both emissions levels
and compliance status than orders, fines and penalties traditionally imposed by the
Ministry and courts. Our results also demonstrate that the adoption of stricter
standards and penalties had a significant impact on emissions levels.
Mots Clés : Information, réglementation
Keywords : Regulation, information
11. Introduction
Issues pertaining to the monitoring and enforcement of environmental
regulations have surprisingly been the object of only recent and still few
empirical analyses.1 An essential issue of interest is the impact of the various
monitoring and enforcement actions on the environmental performance of the
plants. Magat and Viscusi (1990), and Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have
shown that inspections (or the threat of inspections) significantly reduce
absolute levels of water pollution emissions of pulp and paper plants in the
United States and Canada respectively. Gray and Deily (1996) have shown
that increased enforcement actions in the U.S. steel industry have significantly
reduced non-compliance with air pollution emissions standards. Nadeau
(1997) has shown that both inspections and enforcement impact the duration
of firms’ violation of air pollution standards in the pulp and paper industry.2
In view of the difficulties associated with the monitoring and enforcement of
environmental standards and regulations, an increasing number of
environmental regulators around the world have seeked to complement or
supplement traditional enforcement actions (fines and penalties) with the
adoption of structured information programs by which the environmental
performance of polluters is revealed.3 Economists have undertaken empirical
analyses aimed at measuring the impact of such information programs.4 The
impact analysed concerns both the reaction of capital markets to the revealed
information (Hamilton (1995), Konar and Cohen (1997), Lanoie et al. (1998)),
and the changes in the environmental performance of plants as a result of the
information release (Konar and Cohen (1997), Afsah et al. (1997)).5 While
few in numbers, it is generally shown in these papers that capital markets react
                                                          
1
  For a comprehensive survey of the (modest) empirical literature, see Cohen (1998). Deily and
Gray (1991) asserts that their paper is « the first empirical study of the EPA’s enforcement
activity at the plant level. ».
2
  If traditional monitoring and enforcement strategies appear to impact the environmental
performance of the plants, it then becomes of further interest to understand the determinants of the
regulator’s allocation of resources devoted to implementation. Empirical analyses on this issue
include Deily and Gray (1991), Dion et al. (1998), Helland (1998) and Nadeau (1997).
3
  Examples of such programs now abound in both developed (e.g. the Toxics Release Inventory
in the United States) and developing countries (e.g. the ECOWATCH program in the
Philippines).
4
  It may be useful to distinguish between structured information programs whereby the
information release is part of a clearly articulated strategy undertaken by the regulator to reveal
the environmental performance of plants from unstructured information of the type one finds in
newspapers, on a more ad hoc basis.
2significantly to both positive and negative environmental news, and that
affected firms then markedly improve their environmental performance.
From a policy perspective, a potential weakness of the current body of
empirical analyses is their focus on studying either the impact of the
traditional monitoring and enforcement practices or the impact of information
programs. It is to be noted that none of the above papers combine an empirical
analysis of the impact of both traditional enforcement and information
strategies within the context of a single research effort. In this paper, we
address this weakness and thus hope to provide insights on the relative impact
of the traditional (fines and penalties) and emerging (information)
enforcement strategies.
Since July 1990, the Ministry of Environment, Lands and Parks of British
Columbia, Canada (henceforth MOE) publishes a list of firms that either do
not comply with the existing regulation or whose environmental performance
is of concern to the MOE. Simultaneously however, the Ministry continues to
undertake legal action for those violating the regulation. These unique features
allow us to analyse the relative contribution of both types of enforcement
actions on the performance of polluters. To do so, we focus on the
environmental performance of the pulp and paper plants appearing on the list.
Our results suggest that British Columbia’s list of polluters has a larger impact
on both emissions levels and compliance status than penalties traditionally
imposed by the MOE and courts. However, the analysis also suggests that the
adoption of much stricter environmental standards in 1990 accompanied with
a 60 fold increase in the maximum level of penalty explains a large proportion
of the reduction in the level of emissions and improvement in compliance
status. Our results imply that both regulation and information explain the
environmental performance of plants.
In the next section, we briefly describe the institutional and regulatory context
currently in place in British Columbia, and the model we purport to test. In
Section 3, both the estimation strategy and dataset are described. Results are
presented in Section 4. We briefly conclude in Section 5.
                                                                                                                             
5
  Analysis of capital market reactions to unstructured information includes Badrinath and
Bolster (1996), Dasgupta et al. (1998), Klassen and McLaughlin (1996), Lanoie and Laplante
(1994), Muoghalu et al. (1990).
32. Context and model
2.1 Context
Industry and regulatory context
Canada is the largest producer of pulp and paper in the world with
approximately 33% of world production. Within Canada, the 23 pulp and
paper plants located in British Columbia account for approximately 30% of
the Canadian production, with 6.5 million tons of pulp and 1.5 million tons of
paper produced in 1992. These amounted to a total production value of
approximately 4 billion dollars (CAN),6 and 8.5% of British Columbia’s
GDP.7
Pulp is produced essentially with mechanical and/or chemical processes.
Mechanical processes are usually more efficient in terms of the required
amount of wood input to produce a metric ton of pulp. However, the process
produces a fiber of lesser quality than chemical processes. These latter ones
are therefore usually preferred. Both sulfite and kraft are chemical pulp
production processes. Sulfite processes produce pulp of high quality which
needs to be washed, but does not require a bleaching of the pulp. However,
sulfite processes involve high production costs mainly because of the
impossibility to recover the chemicals used in the process. Kraft processes
produce pulp of very high quality. Moreover, kraft offers the possibility of
chemical recovery thus making it less expensive to use than sulfite processes.
However, kraft processes produce a pulp of a darker color ; this makes it
necessary for the pulp to be bleached before being sent to paper machine. The
washing and bleaching steps of the production process are important sources
of pollution : washing produces large amount of biological oxygen demand
(BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS), while bleaching further produces
dioxins and furans used to bleach the dark pulp. If the industry is a major
contributor to British Columbia's economic activity, it is also one of the most
important sources of pollution.
In Canada, jurisdiction over water pollution control (and more generally over
pollution control) is shared by the federal and provincial governments. The
basis of the overlap relies on the Constitution Act of 1867.8 Insofar as water
                                                          
6
  In 1992, 1 $ CAN was approximately worth 0.75 $ US.
7
  Province of British Columbia (1993).
8
  The involvement of the federal government in matters of environmental protection is made
possible through its jurisdiction over fisheries, harbours, criminal law, and its residual power to
legislate for the peace, order and good government of Canada. The appropriate roles and
4pollution is concerned, the Federal government has played an important role
through its Fisheries Act9 under which Pulp and Paper Effluent Regulations10
were first introduced in 1971. However, these Federal regulations were
devised in a way that resulted in the bulk of the pulp and paper plants in
British Columbia being outside the realm of the regulation, and therefore not
having to comply with any of the regulatory standards defined in the Federal
regulations.
On December 13, 1990 the Government of British Columbia introduces the
long-awaited revisions to its own pulp and paper effluent regulations. Each
plant must now obtain a discharge permit in order to operate, and the
obtention of the permit is conditional on the plant using a secondary
wastewater treatment process. Moreover, as shown in Table 1, the revised
regulation considerably tightens up the BOD and TSS standards for those
plants located on the coast of the province (with the Pacific Ocean).11
Table 1
British Columbia Pulp and Paper Effluent Standards
Pre and Post December 13 1990
(Kg / tone)
BOD TSS
Kraft
process
Mechanical
process
Kraft
process
Mechanical
process
Before
Dec. 13,
1990
Coastal plants
Other plants
30
7.5
20
7.5
17.5
10
17.5
10
After
Dec. 13,
1990
All plants
Port Alberni
7.5
4.2
7.5
4.2
11.25
3.9
11.25
3.9
                                                                                                                             
responsibilities of federal and provincial governments are the subject of an everlasting debate
(Kenneth, 1990).
9
  Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, c. F-14.
10
  C.R.C. 1978, c. 830.
11
  In 1988, the Federal Ministry of Ocean and Fisheries had to put an end to shrimps and crabs
fisheries on British Columbia’s coastal waters where 3 pulp and paper plants were located. In 1989,
oysters fisheries had to be stopped in the vicinity of 6 pulp and paper plants. These events may
explain the tightening of the standards for those plants.
5While the effluent standards were location specific (coastal vs non-coastal)
and process specific (kraft vs mechanical), homogeneous standards were
introduced in 1990, with all plants but one having to comply with the same
effluent standards, irrespective of their location and production process. Note
that the standards were considerably tighter for those plants located on the
coastal zone. Standards became effective over a period of 3 years, and all
plants had to comply with the new standards by 1994.
Simultaneously with the adoption of the revised regulation, the MOE seeked
to increase incentives for abatement and compliance with the new set of
standards. As a result, the maximum fines for offences under the Waste
Management Act increased from 50 000 $ (CAN) to 3 million $. At the same
time, the MOE declares its commitment to pursue its recently devised strategy
to publicize, twice a year, the name of plants falling short of an adequate
environmental performance.
British Columbia’s list of polluters
On July 13 1990, the MOE of British Columbia released for the first time (in
British Columbia and in Canada) a list of industrial operations (and
municipalities) which were either not complying with their waste management
permits or which were deemed by the Ministry to be a potential pollution
concern. The Minister then declared that
the release of this material is a clear indication of our
government’s intention to deal forthrightly and decisively
with pollution concerns. (MOE, Press Release, July 13,
1990)
For each entry, the following information is provided : Name of the firm ;
location ; type of concern (e.g. mining operation effluent, pulp mill effluent,
sawmill emissions) ; the reason(s) for which the firm is on the list ; and the
number of times the firm has been on the list (e.g. second time on
noncompliance report ; fourth time on the list).
In order to be listed in the non-compliance section of the list, a firm needs to
be significantly out of compliance with its permit requirements and standards.
Typical entries (reasons) in this section of the list are of the following nature :
- Exceeded permit limits for total suspended solids in July,
August, and September ;
6- Exceeded permit limits for maximum and average total
suspended solids in October, for biological oxygen demand
3 of 13 days in November and for pH two days in
December ;
- Exceeded permit limit for opacity for 4 of 6 months ;
- Incomplete submission of monitoring data.
Operations of concern to the Ministry were defined as « operations some of
which are technically in compliance and others where permits do not exist or
are not required but which by their nature cause concern to the Ministry. »
(Press Release, July 13, 1990). Typical entries in this section were of the
following nature :
- Concern with possible impact of effluent on Kitimat River,
especially at low river flows ;
- Close proximity of landfill leachate to fish bearing streams ;
- Odor problem related to the emission of sulphur gases from
the effluent treatment system ;
- Numerous spills and bypasses ;
- Grizzly bears attracted by the disposal of waste at the local
landfill.
In 1993, a number of industrial facilities started to express dissatisfaction with
appearing on the « pollution concern » section of the list, yet their operations
being in compliance with their permit requirements. Moreover, the criteria for
being classified as « of concern » were seen as being subjective and
inconsistent across regional offices. As a result, this section of the list was
dropped in 1994 and as of 1995, British Columbia’s list of polluters covers
only plants significantly out of compliance with their permit requirements
(Figure 1).12
                                                          
12
  MOE (1993).
7Figure 1
Total number of citations « Of concern » vs « Out of compliance »
1990-1996
2.2 Model
Following the traditional paradigm for analyzing pollution control issues, the
regulator is expected to set and enforce rules of environmental behavior. In
keeping with this understanding of the problem, the policy analysis literature
has focused on appropriate roles for ‘ex ante’ regulation (standards vs.
market-based instruments) and ‘ex post’ liability claims by injured parties.
This conventional policy discussion has focused almost exclusively on
interactions between the regulator and the plant. However, recent research has
suggested powerful roles for two additional agents : the community and the
market. Indeed, recent evidence throughout the world suggests that
neighboring communities can have a powerful influence on plants’
environmental performance (Blackman and Bannister, 1998 ; Pargal and
0
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8Wheeler, 1996). Communities which are richer, better educated, and more
organized find many ways of enforcing environmental norms. Where formal
regulators are present, communities use the political process to influence the
tightness of enforcement. Where formal regulators are absent or ineffective,
‘informal regulation’ is implemented through community groups or NGOs.
Moreover, firms operate in local, national and international markets, where
many agents can affect revenues and costs. Environmental considerations now
affect the decisions of many of these agents. With the worldwide advent of
environmental legislation, investors are increasingly scrutinizing
environmental performance. Among other factors, they have to weigh the
potential for financial losses from regulatory penalties and liability
settlements. In recent years, the importance of investor interest has been
increased by the growth of new stock markets and the internationalization of
investment. For similar reasons, international and local suppliers of financing,
industrial equipment, and engineering services are increasingly reluctant to do
business with firms known as being large polluters or experiencing problems
with environmental regulations. Recent evidence from both the OECD and
developing countries suggests that environmental reputation matters for firms
whose expected costs or revenues are affected by judgments of environmental
performance by customers, suppliers, and stockholders.13
Once we introduce a world of multiple agents (and consequently multiple
incentives), there may be a need to rethink the regulator’s appropriate role in
pollution management. It may be that this role is no longer confined to
producing, monitoring and enforcing rules and standards. Instead, the
regulator can gain leverage through non-traditional programs which harness
the power of communities and markets. In this context, there may be ample
room for information-oriented approaches such as the public disclosure of
plants’ environmental performance.
The notion that such a role exists has certainly gained support among
environmental policy-makers. Despite this widespread acceptance of a role for
the regulator to provide environmental information, the normative foundations
for a public intervention of that nature have not been formally studied. In
particular, the question of whether and under what circumstances
environmental information should be publicly provided has not been
adequately addressed.14
                                                          
13
  See Cohen (1998) for a thorough review of these studies.
14
  An exception is Kennedy et al. (1994).
9From an empirical perspective, the impact of existing public disclosure
programs on the environmental performance of the plants largely remains to
be tested. To our knowledge, only Hamilton (1995) and Konar and Cohen
(1997) have proceeded to a formal econometric analysis of this impact ; both
of their studies however are based on the U.S. EPA’s Toxics Release
Inventory (TRI). We do not know of any other formal analysis of other public
disclosure programs.15 Moreover, given the characteristics of the TRI
program, these authors are unable to account for the impact of the public
disclosure strategy relative to traditional form of prosecutions, fines, and
penalties. In this context, it becomes difficult to determine whether or not
information can be an effective regulatory mechanism relative to traditional
forms of enforcement actions. As pointed out by Konar and Cohen
(1997), « before information remedies are used more frequently as regulatory
mechanisms, we need to understand how they work and what effect they have
on firm behavior ».
Hence, while recent literature appears to indicate a role for public disclosure
programs, it is not yet clear whether or not these programs should complement
or supplement traditional forms of enforcement. In particular, once the
regulator can pursue court actions, fines, and penalties as they typically have
done with the enactment of environmental regulations, is there still a role for
public disclosure? Can public disclosure create further incentives for pollution
control? Given recent research, the model we therefore proceed to test in this
paper is of the following nature :
Pollution = f (Regulation, Traditional Enforcement, Public disclosure, X)
where X is a vector of control variables. In the next section, we proceed to
detail our estimation strategy and dataset.
                                                          
15
  Afsah et al. (1997) provide statistical evidence of the impact of Indonesia’s public disclosure
program known as PROPER. However, the available information limited them to conduct an ex
ante – ex post analysis. They show that the plants object to the first public disclosure in 1995
reduced their emissions of BOD by approximately 45% within a period of 18 months.
10
3. Estimation strategy and dataset
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we use plant-level yearly data from
the pulp and paper industry since this industry has a long history of
environmental regulation and generally offers the best availability of
emissions data.16
Over the period 1987-1996, 24 pulp and paper plants were in operation in
British Columbia. After discussion with the MOE, 4 plants were excluded
since their manufacturing processes were hardly comparable with those of the
other plants. Five other plants were dropped since MOE’s files were
incomplete, especially over the period 1987-1990.
Let us turn to the variables used to estimate our model. The definition, mean,
and standard deviation of the variables are provided in Table 2. The dataset
was entirely provided by the MOE. Most of the data came from public reports.
However, data on emissions and limits was provided to us upon special
request, and involved a manual investigation of a large number of files.
The analysis is performed for both BOD and TSS. For each of them, we use
two different ways of defining the dependent variable, as was used in Laplante
and Rilstone (1996) : the absolute level of pollution (ABSBOD, ABSTSS),
and a measure of the level of compliance with the emissions standards
(COMPBOD, COMPTSS), which is defined as : (actual emissions –
allowable emissions) / allowable emissions.17
                                                          
16
  Magat and Viscusi (1990), Laplante and Rilstone (1996), Dion et al. (1998), Lanoie et al.
(1998) also use the pulp and paper industry for a similar reason.
17
  Allowable emissions (kg / day) are calculated as : emissions standards (kg / tonne) times daily
production (tonnes / day).
Table 2
Definition, mean and standard deviation of variables
(plant-level yearly data covering 15 plants for the period 1987-1996)
VARIABLES DEFINITION MEAN
STANDARD
DEVIATION
Dependent
variables
COMPBOD Compliance rate for BOD (actual – allowable) / allowable -0.08548 0.3075
COMPTSS Compliance rate for TSS : (actual – allowable) / allowable -0.32015 0.37810
ABSBOD Absolute level of BOD emissions (kg/day) 10479 13187
ABSTSS Absolute level of TSS emissions (kg/day) 8687.4 6373.6
Independent
variables
OUT OF
COMPLIANCE
Number of appearances (in a given year) on the polluters
list under the heading «out of compliance»
0.26667 0.53532
OF CONCERN Number of appearances (in a given year) on the polluters
list under the heading «of concern»
0.08889 0.35548
REGUL90 Dummy equal to one when a plant is subject to
the new B.C. regulation, 0 otherwise
0.57037 0.49887
PROSECUTION Number of prosecutions faced by a plant in a given year 0.93333 2.4834
FINE Total amount of fines imposed on a plant in a given year 4314.1 16529
11
2Table 2 (cont’d)
VARIABLES DEFINITION MEAN
STANDARD
DEVIATION
Control
variables
PRODUCTION Production in tons/day 1132.5 510.54
BASSIN Dummy variables capturing the river in which the plant rejects its effluents
Fraser River (omitted) 0.33333 0.47316
1. Vancouver Bassin 0.26667 0.44386
2. Howe Sound River 0.13333 0.47316
3. Columbia Lake 0.06667 0.06268
4. Skeena River 0.06667 0.06268
5. Peace River 0.13333 0.11642
REGION Dummy variable capturing the B.C. administrative region where the plant is located
Vancouver Island Region (omitted) 0.26667 0.40386
1. Lower Mainland Region 0.20000 0.40149
2. Southern Interior Region 0.06667 0.25037
3. Cariboo Region 0.06667 0.25037
4. Skeena Region 0.06667 0.25037
5. Northern Interior Region 0.26667 0.44386
6. Kootenay Region 0.06667 0.25037
PROCESS Dummy equal to 1 if the plant has a mechanical process, 0 otherwise 0.80000 0.40149
12
13
Observe in Figure 2 that emissions levels fell considerably over the
period of analysis and that compliance rate significantly improved.
Figure 2
Actual emissions and limits
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Our independent variables capture the appearance of the plants on the list of
polluters, the tightening of the standards in 1990, and the prosecutions and
fines imposed on the plants over the period of analysis. As explained
previously, until 1994, the lists were divided into two categories : of concern
and out of compliance. Accordingly, we have two variables to capture the
appearance of the plants on these lists. Since two lists are published every
year, and since we are using yearly data, we define the variable OF
CONCERN as the number of times a plant has appeared on the lists under this
heading in a given year (OUT OF COMPLIANCE is defined the same way).
We also lag these variables to allow the plants some time to react to their
appearance on the lists18. In our sample, only one plant never appeared on any
                                                          
18
  As in Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Lanoie (1992), the use of a lagged policy variable may be
justified to avoid any simultaneity problem.
14
list, while another has appeared only once under the OF CONCERN category.
On the contrary, two plants have appeared seven times each on the thirteen
lists that were available (six times under the OUT OF COMPLIANCE
category).
The variable PROSECUTION is defined as the number of prosecutions
against a plant in a given year, while FINE is the total amount of fines
imposed on a plant in a given year. These variables are lagged to allow for
some time of reaction. From 1987 to 1996, there were 126 prosecutions
against the plants in our sample, but only 17 of these resulted in a fine being
imposed ; these fines totaled 582 400 $.
A dummy variable, REGUL90, captures the introduction of the more stringent
regulation in 1990. As mentioned earlier, the regulation became effective over
the period 1991–1994. Hence, the variable REGUL90 takes the value 1
starting only during the exact year each plant was to operate under the new
regulation.
We also include a number of CONTROL VARIABLES. As in Magat and
Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996), a LAGGED DEPENDENT
VARIABLE is introduced to serve as a proxy for the firm’s stock of capital
related to pollution control and for the general character of its abatement
technology. Firms with high levels of pollution in the past are likely to
continue to have high levels in the future because the nature of their
technology makes it costly to achieve pollution reductions.
We were able to account for the actual level of plants’ PRODUCTION
through a calculation performed using two sets of pollution limits. Indeed, the
MOE produces two series of limits : one expressed in terms of kilograms/tons
and another one expressed in terms of kilograms/day. Given that we were
provided with the two series, it was easy to calculate a measure of production
expressed in terms of tons/day. To our knowledge, this is the first time a
measure of the real production is used in a study on pollution levels. Previous
authors, such as Magat and Viscusi (1990) and Laplante and Rilstone (1996),
used a measure based on plants’ production capacity. During the period under
study, the average production followed a somewhat erratic path : a sharp
increase was observed in the first three years (1987-1990), followed by an
important reduction in the 1990-91 recession, then followed by a steady
increase until 1996.
Two sets of variables are introduced to capture the localisation of the plants :
BASSIN and REGION. BASSIN refers to the river in which each plant rejects
its pollutants, while REGION refers to the B.C. administrative region where
15
the plant is situated. Localisation variables are useful to account for aspects
such as varying importance of the ecologist lobby across regions, or
potentially different levels of monitoring across regions. These differences
may be due, among other things, to the level of deterioration of the local
ecosystems (Pargal and Wheeler (1996), Dion et al. (1998)).
Finally, a dummy variable is included to account for the pulp PRODUCTION
PROCESS of the mill. Our PROCESS variable is equal to one when the
mechanical process is used. Its coefficient is expected to be negative.
4. Empirical results
The estimations are performed using a generalized least-squares (GLS)
procedure based on the cross-sectionnally and time-wise autoregressive model
presented in Kmenta (1986, pp.616-625)19. Table 3 and 4 present the results
pertaining to BOD and TSS respectively. Each table includes eight
specifications, four using the compliance rate as the dependent variable and
four using the absolute level of pollutant. For each dependent variable, the
various specifications allow for different sets of localisation variables, and for
lagged or contemporaneous environmental policy variables20. Overall, the
explanatory power of the different specifications is satisfactory, and the results
are fairly stable across specifications.
The appearance of a plant on the list under the heading OUT OF
COMPLIANCE has a contemporaneous impact on both pollutants. Indeed, all
coefficients of the variable OUT OF COMPLIANCE, except one, are negative
and significant. For BOD, the appearance on the list leads to an improvement
of 0.063 in the compliance rate, and to a reduction in the absolute level of
emissions in the range of 1111-1164 kg/day. For TSS, the appearance on the
list leads to an improvement of the compliance rate of 0.094, and to a
reduction in the absolute level of emissions in the range of 1225-1261 kg/day.
                                                          
19
  Initial tests showed the presence first-order serial correlation and of heteroskedasticity.
20
  Other attempts were made using a time trend, fixed effects or the plants’ age as additional
independent variables. Their inclusion did not improve significantly the explanatory power of our
regressions as confirmed by log-likelihood ratio tests.
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Table 3: REGRESSION RESULTS – BOD
Coefficients (t-statistics)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Dependent variables COMPBOD COMPBOD COMPBOD COMPBOD ABSBOD ABSBOD ABSBOD ABSBOD
R SQUARE 0.8947 0.8896 0.9030 0.9002 0.8852 0.8824 0.8841 0.8823
COMPBOD(1) b 0.60685
(13.71)*
0.57159
(12.94)*
0.64456
(14.62)*
0.60413
(13.53)*
ABSBOD(1) 0.65556
(12.97)*
0.64247
(13.17)*
0.66219
(13.04)*
0.64804
(13.27)*
PRODUCTION -0.67E-04
(-1.179)
-0.89E-04
(-1.59)
-0.79E-04
(-1.477)
-0.11E-03
(-2.094)*
1.1544
(0.292)
1.5326
(1.279)
1.2197
(0.234)
1.6450
(1.434)
PROSECUTION 0.26E-02
(0.2972)
0.35E-02
(0.4021)
63.552
(0.5223
80.709
(0.6493)
PROSECUTION(1) -0.16E-02
(-0.1637)
-0.30E-03
(-0.033)
-68.518
(-0.5573)
-66.051
(-0.5244)
FINE 0.66E-06
(0.4134)
0.78E-06
(0.4725)
-0.31E-01
(-1.78)**
-0.32E-01
(-1.80)**
FINE(1) -0.29E-05
(-1.938)*
-0.33E-05
(-2.033)*
-0.25E-01
(-1.560)
-0.25E-01
(-1.494)
REGUL90 -0.17193
(-3.882)*
-0.17191
(-3.774)*
-0.15814
(-3.828)*
-0.16664
(-3.981)
-4310
(-5.045)*
-4511.1
(-5.194)*
-3799.6
(-4.484)*
-4046
(-4.708)*
OF CONCERN 0.53E-02
0.1215)
0.14E-01
(0.3187)
-1098
(-1.231)
-1059.6
(-1.19)
OF CONCERN(1) -0.12E-01
(-0.2727)
-0.39E-01
(-0.8782)
-329.93
(-0.3823)
-250.39
(-0.2893)
OUT OF COMPLIANCE -0.63E-01
(-1.85)**
-0.48E-01
(-1.318)
-1164.4
(-2.032)*
-1111.4
(-1.91)**
OUT OF
COMPLIANCE(1)
-0.26E-01
(-0.6968)
-0.31E-01
(-0.8509)
-262.08
(-0.3993)
-175.90
(-2684)
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PROCESS -0.14426
(-2.183)*
-0.16612
(-2.229)*
-0.12587
(-1.850)*
-0.14222
(-1.87)**
-1490
(-1.056)
-2389.1
(-1.72)**
-1331.5
(-0.9626)
-2295.7
(-1.69)**
REGION 1 -0.48E-01
(-0.7489)
-0.39E-01
(-0.5940)
-1044
(-0.6878)
-645.30
(-0.4414)
REGION 2 -0.30E-01
(-0.3371)
-0.36E-01
(-0.4686)
-1657.1
(-0.9010)
-1261.3
(-0.7071)
REGION 3 -0.28424
(-1.11)
-0.37233
(-1.34)
-2323.7
(-1.141)
-2126.2
(-1.079)
REGION 4 0.84E-02
(0.60E-01)
-0.97E-02
(-0.1005)
927.22
(0.4213)
679.14
(0.2820)
REGION 5 0.48E-01
(0.9108)
0.16E-01
(0.2944)
-683.79
(-0.5187)
-482.87
(-0.3810)
REGION 6 0.65635
(1.410)
0.47485
(0.9113)
473.26
(0.2119)
331.74
(0.1429)
BASSIN 1 0.27E-01
(0.5328)
0.38E-01
(0.8045)
1799.4
(1.336)
1623.4
(1.238)
BASSIN 2 0.16573
(0.9922)
0.16561
(1.121)
212.56
(0.1913)
384.44
(0.3604)
BASSIN 3 0.78573
(1.659)**
0.63661
(1.193)
1907.4
(0.9609)
1548
(0.7398)
BASSIN 4 0.24E-01
(0.1727)
0.24E-01
(0.2563)
2278.8
(1.134)
1803.8
(0.8050)
BASSIN 5 0.40E-01
(0.4148)
-0.92E-02
(-0.0985)
1852.5
(1.051)
1906.8
(1.143)
CONSTANT -0.32E-02
(-0.3E-01)
-0.15E-01
(-0.1582)
0.34E-01
(0.3339)
0.34E-01
(0.3939)
4481.3
(1.859)**
3089.8
(1.667)**
3587.8
(1.515)
2438.6
(1.345)
Fischer test 24.41* 24.41* 24.81* 25.71* 23.00* 24.36* 23.29* 24.79*
LIKELIHOOD RATIO
TEST
190.93* 188.86* 197.88* 196.03* 93.57* 91.61* 89.98* 87.88*
* significant at 5%, **  significant at 10% ;  b (1) means that the variable has been lagged one year
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TABLE 4: REGRESSION RESULTS – TSS
Coefficients (t-statistics)
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Dependent variables COMPTSS COMPTSS COMPTSS COMPTSS ABSTSS ABSTSS ABSTSS ABSTSS
R SQUARE 0.9679 0.9194 0.9328 0.9053 0.9477 0.9380 0.9439 0.9358
COMPTSS(1) b 0.60324
(11.43)*
0.75797
(14.63)*
0.61274
(9.397)*
0.72925
(11.82)*
ABSTSS(1) 0.62004
(12.33)*
0.63228
(11.10)*
0.58671
(11.38)*
0.60083
(10.38)*
PRODUCTION -0.56E-04
(-1.924)**
-0.62E-04
(-1.729)*
-0.50E-04
(-1.473)
-0.57E-04
(-1.499)
2.4796
(3.908)*
1.6780
(2.431)*
2.7832
(4.357)*
2.1067
(3.058)*
PROSECUTION -0.18E-02
(-0.4848)
-0.26E-02
(-0.4436)
1.2534
(0.0155)
-23.552
(-0.2872)
PROSECUTION(1) -0.45E-02
(-0.9946)
-0.37E-02
(-0.6278)
-35.591
(-0.4583)
-62.611
(-0.7571)
FINE 0.16E-05
(1.553)
0.21E-05
(1.877)**
0.52E-02
(0.4768)
0.24E-02
(0.2018)
FINE(1) -0.93E-06
(-1.393)
-0.84E-06
(-0.9770)
-0.14E-03
(-0.014)
0.58E-03
(0.0508)
REGUL90 -0.70E-01
(-2.503)*
-0.23E-01
(-0.8591)
-0.69E-01
(-2.392)*
-0.41E-01
(-1.263)
-1492.1
(-3.699)*
-1291.4
(-3.139)*
-1909.6
(-4.628)*
-1745.2
(-4.165)*
OF CONCERN -0.48E-01
(-2.296)*
-0.69E-01
(-1.95)**
-33.697
(-0.087)
43.531
(0.1020)
OF CONCERN(1) -0.26E-01
(-0.7079)
-0.32E-01
(-0.7600)
-346.53
(-0.9288)
-325.81
(-0.8024)
OUT OF COMPLIANCE -0.93E-01
(-3.914)*
-0.95E-01
(-3.123)*
-1261.2
(-3.588)*
-1225.1
(3.413)*
OUT OF COMPLIANCE(1) -0.38E-01
(-1.367)
-0.45E-01
(-1.381)
-495.98
(-1.203)
-482.26
(-1.139)
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PROCESS -0.11142
(-2.046)*
-0.95E-02
(-0.1842)
-0.10756
(-1.91)**
-0.24E-01
(-0.4512)
-750.81
(-1.458)
-105.85
(-0.1912)
-654.28
(-1.298)
-118.17
(-0.2224)
REGION 1 -0.44E-01
(-1.556)
-0.56E-01
(-1.49)
-1235.5
(-2.010)*
-1245.9
(-2.007)*
REGION 2 0.27E-01
(0.3049)
0.24E-01
(0.2663)
213.19
(0.1541)
221.20
(0.1564)
REGION 3 0.27979
(3.113)*
0.26113
(2.810)*
2149
(2.576)*
1939.8
(2.279)*
REGION 4 0.18074
(2.26)*
0.16197
(1.722)**
2358.7
(2.555)*
2179.9
(2.116)*
REGION 5 0.10851
(2.502)*
0.11354
(3.072)*
1162.5
(2.286)*
1005.7
(1.978)*
REGION 6 0.10432
(1.142)
0.67E-01
(0.6274)
964.13
(1.133)
649.89
(0.7328)
BASSIN 1 -0.16E-01
(-0.4686)
-0.66E-01
(-1.84)**
-1131
(-1.947)*
-1036.2
(-1.771)*
BASSIN 2 -0.11893
(-1.69)**
-0.95E-01
(-1.28)
-1609.6
(-1.94)**
-1616.3
(-1.987)*
BASSIN 3 0.43E-02
(0.052)
-0.56E-01
(-0.5679)
-240.43
(-0.2720)
-382.15
(-0.4152)
BASSIN 4 0.94E-01
(1.252)
0.50E-01
(0.5698)
1417.6
(1.557)
1323.9
(1.281)
BASSIN 5 -0.23E-01
(-0.4112)
-0.53E-01
(-0.9011)
-890.29
(-1.16)
-762.13
(-0.9610)
CONSTANT -0.87E-01
(-1.423)
-0.53E-02
(-0.053)
-0.92E-01
(-1.358)
0.23E-01
(0.3884)
-1492.1
(-3.699)*
2216.7
(2.062)*
867.84
(1.038)
2157.7
(1.993)*
FISCHERTEST 48.41* 30.60* 32.52* 24.42* 37.50* 35.45* 31.77* 31.11*
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST 65.80* 50.96* 67.93* 54.13* 86.15* 83.36* 75.72* 73.93*
* significant at 5%, **  significant at 10% ;  b (1) means that the variable has been lagged one year
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The significance of the contemporaneous OUT OF COMPLIANCE variable
and not of the lagged variable is not necessarily surprising given that there are
generally two lists a year (in certain years, the first list was published in
January). The appearance on the list under the heading OF CONCERN seems
to have no impact on pollution, which may suggest that the MOE may have
been correct to eliminate this category in 1994.
The variable capturing the major change in regulation REGUL90 is almost
everywhere negative and significant. The impact of this new regulation is
strong : improvement in the compliance rate of 0.158 for BOD and of 0.07 for
TSS ; reduction of the level of emissions in the range of 3800-4511 kg/day for
BOD and in the range of 1291–1909 kg/day for TSS.
As discussed earlier, such a change in limits leads to an increase the expected
probability of being caught in non-compliance with the negative consequences
that may follow for firms. Plants’ reactions to the new limits have been
important ; as shown in Figure 2, plants had a better rate of compliance at the
end of the period with stricter limits than at the beginning of the period when
limits were less stringent. Discussions with MOE officials led us to believe
that, with the new limits, all firms had to be equipped with « state-of-the-art »
abatement technologies (secondary treatment), which have been installed in
only few recent plants before the new regulation was adopted.
PROSECUTIONS have no impact on either types of pollutants, while lagged
FINES lead to an improvement in the BOD compliance rate (elasticity in the
-0.15 / -0.17 range). It is instructive to compare the magnitude of the impact of
fines versus appearing as being « out of compliance ». Can it be said whether
the « information approach » has a greater or a smaller impact than the
traditional enforcement mechanisms?  It is difficult to compare the coefficients
of these variables given that the FINE variable is continuous and can be
interpreted through the calculation of a conventional elasticity, while the OUT
OF COMPLIANCE variable is a non-continuous dummy variable.
Nevertheless, three observations can be made.
First, the appearance on the out of compliance list has an impact on both types
of pollutants (expressed either in absolute terms or in terms of compliance
rate), while the fines only have an effect on the BOD compliance rate (and not
on absolute emissions levels). Second, our coefficients indicate that doubling
the average size of the fines would lead to an improvement in the BOD
compliance rate of approximately 15 %, i.e. a reduction of 0.013 in the
compliance rate ; on the other hand, an additional appearance on the OUT OF
COMPLIANCE list leads to a reduction of 0.063 in the BOD compliance rate.
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Third, the fact that lagged FINES variable is significant, while it is the
contemporaneous OUT OF COMPLIANCE variable that is significant, may
suggest that lists of worste polluters can provide a stronger incentive than
conventional enforcement measures for a quick response to correct a
damageable situation. Altogether, these three observations suggest that the
B.C. lists  could have had a stronger impact than the fines as they were
applied.
Among the CONTROL VARIABLES, the lagged dependent variable has
everywhere a strong and significant impact. The coefficients are in the
0.57-0.75 range, which implies that approximately 65% of the pollution in a
given year (absolute emissions or compliance rate) is explained by the
pollution in the preceding year. Similar results were observed elsewhere
(Magat and Viscusi (1990) have coefficients in the 0.95-0.98 range).
The PRODUCTION level has a positive impact on the absolute level of TSS
emissions and a negative impact on the TSS compliance rate (elasticity in the
range 0.22 / 0.36 for the absolute level of pollution, and in the range
-0.21 / -0.26 for the compliance rate). These results suggest that larger firms
may be able to comply more easily with the regulation for reasons like the
existence of economies of scale in the abatement technology. For BOD, the
same pattern is observed in the signs of the coefficients, but only one of them
is significant. This result parallels that of Lanoie et al. (1998) showing that
reductions in production may be a good mean to reduce TSS emissions, but
not necessarily a good way to influence BOD emissions.
The LOCALISATION variables are never significant, except one, in the
regressions related to BOD, while many of them are significant in the
regressions related to TSS. This indicates that, for TSS, specific
characteristics of the localisation, like stringency of local DOE officials, have
an influence. Lastly, the coefficients of our PROCESS variable are
everywhere  negative, and they tend to be more significant in the BOD
regressions than in the TSS. This shows that, as expected, the use of the
mechanical process leads to higher compliance rate and lower absolute levels
of emissions.
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5. Conclusion
This paper has examined the relative impact of both traditional enforcement
practices and information strategies on  pollution levels and rates of
compliance. The analysis was performed in the context of British Columbia
where the MOE publishes, since 1990, a list of firms that either do not comply
with the existing regulation or that are of concern to the MOE, and where
simultaneously the Ministry continues to undertake legal action for those
violating the regulation. The empirical investigation was based on a sample
covering 15 plants in the B.C. pulp and paper industry during the period 1987
– 1996, and two types of pollutants were considered : BOD and TSS. Our
results showed that (1) a tightening up of the standards in 1990 had a very
significant impact on plants’ environmental performance ; (2) appearances on
polluters’ list under the heading « out of compliance » led plants to improve
their environmental performance ; and (3) fines had a beneficial impact on
plants’ compliance rates with respect to BOD. Furthermore, we provided some
evidence that the impact of appearing on the polluters’ list was stronger than
that of fines.
Our analysis suggests that, although useful, information strategies cannot
necessarily replace traditional enforcement practices in the area of
environmental protection. In fact, these two approaches can perhaps better be
used as complementary policy instruments in order to achieve improvements
in firms’ environmental performance. This way of proceeding presents the
advantage of putting different types of pressure (reputational, financial,
judiciary) on firms, increasing the likelihood that they will undertake actions
in line with environmental protection.
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